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Administrative Law in the
Automated State
Cary Coglianese

In the future, administrative agencies will rely increasingly on digital automation
powered by machine learning algorithms. Can U.S. administrative law accommodate such a future? Not only might a highly automated state readily meet longstanding administrative law principles, but the responsible use of machine learning
algorithms might perform even better than the status quo in terms of fulfilling administrative law’s core values of expert decision-making and democratic accountability. Algorithmic governance clearly promises more accurate, data-driven decisions. Moreover, due to their mathematical properties, algorithms might well prove
to be more faithful agents of democratic institutions. Yet even if an automated state
were smarter and more accountable, it might risk being less empathic. Although the
degree of empathy in existing human-driven bureaucracies should not be overstated,
a large-scale shift to government by algorithm will pose a new challenge for administrative law: ensuring that an automated state is also an empathic one.

B

ecause the future knows no bounds, the future of administrative law is vast
indeed. In the near term, administrative law in the United States will undoubtedly center around how the U.S. Supreme Court decides cases raising core administrative law issues such as the nondelegation doctrine and judicial
deference to agencies’ statutory interpretation. But over the longer term, new issues will confront the field of administrative law as new changes occur in government and in society. One major change on the horizon will be an increasingly
automated administrative state in which many governmental tasks will be carried
out by digital systems, especially those powered by machine learning algorithms.
Administrative agencies today undertake a range of activities–granting licenses, issuing payments, adjudicating claims, and setting rules–each of which traditionally has been executed by government officials. But it is neither difficult nor
unrealistic to imagine a future in which members of the public, when they interact
with government, increasingly find themselves interacting predominantly with
digital systems rather than human officials. Even today, the traditional administrative tasks for which human beings have long been responsible are increasingly augmented by computer systems. Few people in the United States today think
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twice about using government websites to apply for unemployment benefits, register complaints, or file paperwork, rather than visiting or telephoning government
offices. The federal government has even created an online portal–USA.gov–
that provides its users with easy access to the panoply of resources and digital application processes now available to the public via an extensive network of state
and federal government websites.
The transition to this online interaction with government over the last quartercentury portends what will likely be a deeper and wider technological transformation of governmental processes over the next quarter-century. Moving beyond the digitization of front-end communication with government, the future
will likely feature the more extensive automation of back-end decision-making,
which today still often remains firmly in the discretion of human officials. But we
are perhaps only a few decades away from an administrative state that will operate
on the basis of automated systems built with machine learning algorithms, much
like important aspects of the private sector increasingly will. This will lead to an
administrative state characterized by what I have elsewhere called algorithmic
adjudication and robotic rulemaking.1 Instead of having human officials make discretionary decisions, such as judgments about whether individual claimants qualify for disability benefits, agencies will be able to rely on automated systems to
make these decisions. Claims-processing systems could be designed, for example, to import automatically a vast array of data from electronic medical records
and then use an artificial intelligence system to process these data and determine
whether claimants meet a specified probability threshold to qualify for benefits.2
If many of the tasks that government currently completes through decisionmaking by human officials come to be performed entirely by automated decision
tools and computer systems, how will administrative law respond to this transformation to an automated state? How should it?
Most existing administrative law principles can already accommodate the
widespread adoption of automation throughout the administrative state. Not
only have agencies already long relied on a variety of physical machines that exhibit automaticity, but an automated state–or at least a responsible automated
state–could be thought of as the culmination of administrative law’s basic vision
of government that relies on neutral public administration of legislatively delegated authority. Administrative law will not need to be transformed entirely to operate in an era of increasing automation because that automation, when responsibly implemented, will advance the democratic principles and good governance
values that have long underlay administrative law.
Nevertheless, even within an otherwise responsible automated state, there will
come to be an important ingredient of good governance that increasingly could
turn out to be missing: human empathy. Even bureaucracies comprising human
officials can be cold and sterile, but an era of extreme automation could present a
150 (3) Summer 2021
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state of crisis in human care–or, more precisely, a crisis in the lack of such care.
In an increasingly automated state, administrative law will need to find ways to
encourage agencies to ensure that members of the public will continue to have
opportunities to engage with humans, express their voices, and receive acknowledgment of their predicaments. The automated state will, in short, also need to be
an empathic state.

T

he information technology revolution that launched several decades ago
shows few signs of abating. Technologists today are both revealing and
reaching new frontiers with the use of advanced algorithmic technologies variously referred to as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and predictive analytics. These terms–sometimes used interchangeably–encompass a
broad range of tools that permit the rapid processing of large volumes of data that
can yield highly accurate forecasts and thereby facilitate the automation of many
distinct tasks. In the private sector, algorithmic innovations are allowing the automation of a wide range of functions previously handled by trained humans, such
as the reading of chest X-rays, the operation of automobiles, and the granting of
loans by financial institutions.
Public administrators have taken notice of these algorithmic advances in the
private sector. Some advances in the business world even have direct parallels to
governmental tasks. Companies such as eBay and PayPal, for example, have developed their own highly successful automated online dispute resolution tools to
resolve complaints without the direct involvement of human employees.3 Overall, government officials see in modern data analytics the possibility of building systems that could automate a variety of governmental tasks, all with the
potential to deliver increased administrative efficiency, speed, consistency, and
accuracy.
The vision of an automated administrative state might best be exemplified today by developments in the Republic of Estonia, a small Baltic country that has
thoroughly embraced digital government as a mark of distinction. The country’s
e-Estonia project has transformed the nation’s administration by digitizing and
securely storing vast amounts of information about individuals, from their medical records to their employment information to their financial statements.4 That
information is cross-linked through a digital infrastructure called X-Road, so that
a person’s records can be accessed instantly by any entity that needs them, subject to limits intended to prevent wrongdoing. This widespread digitization has
facilitated the automation of a range of government services: individuals can easily vote, apply for a loan, file their taxes, and complete other administrative tasks
without ever needing to interact with a human official, simply by transferring
their digital information to complete forms and submit requests. By automating
many of its bureaucratic processes, Estonia has saved an estimated 2 percent of its
106
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GDP each year. The country is even exploring the use of an automated “judge” to
resolve small claims disputes.5
Other countries such as Denmark and South Korea are also leading the world
in the adoption of so-called e-government tools.6 The United States may not have
yet achieved quite the same level of implementation of automated government,
but it is certainly not far behind. Federal, state, and local agencies throughout the
United States have not only embraced web-based applications–such as those
compiled on the USA.gov website–but have begun to deploy the use of machine
learning algorithms to automate a range of administrative decision-making processes. In most of these cases, human officials remain involved to some extent, but
a significant amount of administrative work in the United States is increasingly
conducted through digital systems.
Automation helps federal, state, and local governments navigate challenging resource-allocation decisions in the management of public programs. Several states have implemented algorithmic tools to help make decisions about the
award of Medicaid and other social benefits, seeking to speed up and improve the
consistency of claims processing.7 Similarly, the federal Social Security Administration uses automated tools to help support human appeals judges’ efforts to provide quality oversight of an agency adjudicatory process that handles as many as
2.5 million disability benefits claims each year.8
Municipalities rely on automated systems when deciding where to send health
and building inspectors.9 Some local authorities use such systems when making
choices about where and when to deploy social workers to follow up on allegations of child abuse and neglect.10 Federal agencies, meanwhile, have used algorithmic systems to analyze consumer complaints, process reports of workplace
injuries, and evaluate public comments on proposed rules.11
Criminal law enforcement agencies throughout the United States also rely on
various automated tools. They have embraced tools that automate deployment of
officer patrols based on predictions of locations in cities where crime is most likely
to occur.12 Many law enforcement agencies have also widely used automated facial
recognition tools to facilitate suspect identification or for security screenings.13
Regulatory agencies similarly have deployed automated tools for targeting auditing and enforcement resources. States have employed data analytics to detect
fraud and errors in their unemployment insurance programs.14 The federal Securities and Exchange Commission and the Internal Revenue Service have adopted
algorithmic tools to help detect fraudulent behavior and other wrongdoing.15
In these and other ways, public authorities across the United States have already made considerable strides toward an increasingly automated government.
Over the next several decades, governmental use of automation driven by artificial intelligence tools will surely spread still further and is likely to lead to the
transformation of or phasing out of many jobs currently performed by govern150 (3) Summer 2021

107

Administrative Law in the Automated State

ment employees.16 The future state that administrative law will govern will be one
of increasingly automated administration.

C

an administrative law accommodate an automated state? At first glance, the
prospect of an automated state might seem to demand a fundamental rewriting of administrative law. After all, administrative law developed to constrain the discretion of human officials, to keep their work within the bounds of the
law, and to prevent the kinds of principal-agent problems that can arise in the relationships between human decision-makers. Moreover, one of administrative law’s
primary tenets–that governmental processes should be transparent and susceptible to reason-giving–would seem to stand as a barrier to the deployment of the very
machine learning algorithms that are driving the emerging trends in automation.17
That is because machine learning algorithms–sometimes referred to as “blackbox” algorithms–have properties that can make them opaque and hard to explain.
Unlike traditional statistical algorithms, in which variables are selected by humans
and resulting coefficients can be pointed to as explaining specified amounts of variation in a dependent variable, learning algorithms effectively discover their own
patterns in the data and do not generate results that associate explanatory power
to specific variables. Data scientists can certainly understand and explain the goals
and general properties of machine learning algorithms, but overall these algorithms
have a degree of autonomy–hence their “learning” moniker–that can make it
more difficult to explain precisely why they reach any specific forecast that they do.
They do not usually provide any basis for the kind of causal statements often used to
justify administrative decisions (such as “X is justified because it causes Y”).
As a result, transparency concerns are reasonable when considering a future of
an automated state based on machine learning systems. But on even a modest degree of additional reflection, these concerns would appear neither to act as any intrinsic barrier to the reliance on machine learning automation nor necessarily to
demand any fundamental transformation of U.S. administrative law to accommodate an automated state. Administrative law has never demanded anything close
to absolute transparency nor required meticulous or exhaustively detailed reasoning, even under the arbitrary and capricious standard of Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act.18 Administrative agencies that rely on machine learning
systems should be able to satisfy any reason-giving obligations under existing legal
principles by explaining in general terms how the algorithm was designed to work
and demonstrating that it has been validated to work as designed by comparing
its results to those generated by the status quo process. An adequate explanation
could involve merely describing the type of algorithm used, disclosing the objective the algorithm was established to meet, and showing how the algorithm processed a certain type of data to produce results that were shown to meet the algorithm’s defined objective as well as or better than current processes.
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Such an explanation would, in effect, mirror the kinds of explanations that
administrators currently offer when they rely on physical rather than digital machines. For example, in justifying the imposition of an administrative penalty on
a food processor for failing to store perishable food at a cool temperature, an administrator need not be able to explain exactly how a thermometer works, just
that it reports temperatures accurately. Courts have long treated instrument validation for physical machines as a sufficient basis for agency actions grounded on
such instruments. Moreover, they have typically deferred to administrators’ expertise in cases in which government officials have relied on complex instruments
or mathematical analyses. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council called upon courts to be their “most deferential” when an administrative agency is “making predictions, within its area of
special expertise, at the frontiers of science.”19 More recently, the Supreme Court
noted in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resource Council that whenever an agency decision
“‘requires a high degree of technical expertise,’ we must defer to ‘the informed
discretion of the responsible agencies.’”20 Lower courts have followed these instructions and have upheld agencies’ reliance on complex (even if not machine
learning) algorithms in various contexts.
It is difficult to see the Supreme Court gaining any more confidence in judges’ ability to provide independent technological assessments when technologies
and statistical techniques grow still more complex in an era of machine learning.
Unless the Court should gain a new source of such confidence and abandon the
postures it took in Baltimore Gas & Electric and Marsh, nothing in administrative
law’s reason-giving requirements would seem to serve as any insuperable barrier
to administrative agencies’ more extensive reliance on systems based on machine
learning or other advanced predictive techniques, even if they are properly characterized today as black-box algorithms. That portrayal of machine learning algorithms as a black box also appears likely to grow less apt in the coming decades, as
data scientists are currently working extensively to develop advanced techniques
that can better explain the outputs such complex algorithms generate.21 Advances
in “explainable” artificial intelligence techniques likely will only make automation still more compatible with long-standing administrative law values.
Of course, all of this is not to say that agencies will or should always receive
deference for how they design or operate their systems. Under the standard articulated in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Insurance Co., agencies
will still need to provide basic information about the purposes behind their automated systems and how they generally operate.22 They will need to show that they
have carefully considered key design options. And they will likely need to demonstrate through accepted auditing and validation efforts that these systems do operate to produce results as intended.23 But all this is to say that it will almost certainly be possible for agencies to provide the necessary information to justify the
150 (3) Summer 2021
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outcomes that their systems produce. In other words, long-standing administrative law principles seem ready and fit for an automated age.

I

n important respects, a shift to automated administration could even be said
to represent something of an apotheosis of the principles behind administrative law. Much of administrative law has been focused on the potential problems created by the discretion that human officials exercise under delegated authority. By automating administration, those problems can be mitigated, and the
control of human discretion may be enhanced by the literal hardwiring of certain
governmental tasks.
Automation can advance two major themes that have long characterized much
of U.S. administrative law: one theme centers on keeping the exercise of administrative authority democratically accountable, while the other seeks to ensure that
such authority is based on sound expert judgment. The reason-giving thrust behind the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard, for
example, reflects both of these themes. Reasoned decision-making provides a basis for helping ensure that agencies both remain faithful to their democratic mandates and base their decisions on sound evidence and analysis. Likewise, the institutionalized regimen of White House review of prospective regulations both facilitates greater accountability to a democratically elected president and promotes
expert agency decision-making through the benefit-cost analysis that it calls on
agencies to conduct.24
In the same vein, in approving judicial deference to agencies’ statutory interpretations, it is little accident that the Supreme Court’s widely cited decision in
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council stressed both reasons of democratic accountability and substantive expertise.25 It highlighted how agencies are situated
within a “political branch of the Government” as well as how they simultaneously possess “great expertise”–and thus are better suited than courts to make judgments about the meaning of ambiguous statutory terms.26 Although the future of
the Chevron doctrine itself appears uncertain at best, the Court’s underlying emphasis on accountability and expertise is unlikely to disappear, as they are inherent qualities of administrative governance.
Both qualities can be enhanced by machine learning and automation. It is perhaps most obvious that automation can contribute to the goal of expert administration. When automated systems improve the accuracy of agency decisionmaking–which is what makes machine learning and other data analytic techniques look so promising–this will necessarily promote administrative law’s goal
of enhancing agency expertise. Artificial intelligence promises to deliver the state
of the art when it comes to expert governing. When the Veterans Administration
(VA), for example, recently opted to rely on an automated algorithmic system to
predict which veterans are at a higher risk of suicide (and thus in need of more
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urgent care), it did so because this analytic system was smarter than even experienced psychiatrists.27 “The fact is, we can’t rely on trained medical experts to
identify people who are truly at high risk [because they are] no good at it,” noted
one VA psychiatrist.28
Likewise, when it comes to administrative law’s other main goal–democratic accountability–automated systems can also advance the ball. The democratic advantages of automation may seem counterintuitive at first: machine-based
governance would hardly seem consistent with a Lincolnesque notion of government by “the people.” But the reality is that automated systems themselves still
demand people who can design, test, and audit such systems. As long as these human designers and overseers operate systems in a manner consistent with the parameters set out for an agency in its governing statute, automated systems themselves can prevent the kind of slippage and shirking that can occur when agencies
must rely on thousands of human officials to carry out major national programs
and policies. Even when it comes to making new rules under authority delegated
to it by Congress, agencies could very well find that automation promotes democratic accountability rather than detracts from it. Some level of accountability
will be demanded by the properties of machine learning algorithms themselves.
To function, these algorithms depend not merely on an “intelligible principle” to
guide them; they need a principle that can be precisely specified in mathematical
terms.29 In this way, automation could very well drive the demand for still greater
specification and clarity in statutes about the goals of administration, more than
even any potential judicial reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine might
produce.
Although oversight of the design and development of automated systems will
remain important to ensure that they are created in accord with democratically
affirmed values, once operating, they should pose far fewer opportunities for
the kinds of problems, such as capture and corruption, that administrative law
has long sought to prevent. Unlike human beings, who might pursue their own
narrow interests instead of those of the broader public, algorithms will be programmed to optimize the objectives defined by their designers. As long as those
designers are accountable to the public, and as long as the system objectives are
defined in non-self-interested ways that comport with relevant legislation, then
the algorithms themselves pose no risk of capture and corruption. In an important sense, they will be more accountable in their execution than even human officials can be when it comes to implementing law.
This is not to suggest that automated systems will amount to a panacea nor that
their responsible development and use will be easy. They can certainly be used in
legally and morally problematic ways. Furthermore, their use by agencies will still
be subject to constraints beyond administrative law–for instance, legal constraints
under the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause–that apply to all gov150 (3) Summer 2021

111

Administrative Law in the Automated State

ernmental actions. In fact, equality concerns raised by the potential for algorithmic bias may well become the most salient legal issue that automated systems will
confront in the coming years. Bias obviously exists with human decision-making,
but it also is a concern with machine learning algorithms, especially when the underlying data used to train these algorithms already contain (human-created) biases. Nevertheless, absent an independent showing of animus, automated systems
based on machine learning algorithms may well withstand scrutiny under equal
protection doctrine, at least if that doctrine does not change much over time.30
Governmental reliance on machine learning algorithms would be able to avoid
actionable conduct under equal protection analysis even if an administrator elected to use data that included variables on race, gender, or other protected classifications. As long as the objective the algorithm is programmed to achieve is not
stated in terms of such protected classifications, it will be hard, if not impossible, to show that the algorithm has used any class-based variables as a determinative basis for any particular outcome. The outcomes these algorithms generate
derive from effectively autonomous mathematical processes that discern patterns
among variables and relationships between different variables. Presumably, machine learning algorithms will seldom if ever support the kind of clear and categorical determinations based on class-related variables that the Supreme Court
has rejected, where race or other protected classes have been given an explicit and
even dispositive weight in governmental decisions.31 Even when used with data
on class variables, the use of machine learning algorithms might well lead to better outcomes for members of a protected class overall.32
Moreover, with greater reliance on algorithm-based automated systems, governments will have a new ability to reduce undesired biases by making mathematical adjustments to their algorithms, sometimes without much loss in accuracy.33
Such an ability will surely make it easier to tamp out biases than it currently is to
eliminate humans’ implicit biases. In an automated state of the future, government may find itself less prone to charges of undue discrimination.
For these reasons, it would appear that long-standing principles of administrative law, and even constitutional law, will likely continue to operate in an automated state, encouraging agencies to act responsibly by both preserving democratic accountability and making smarter, fairer decisions. This is not to say that
existing principles will remain unchanged. No one should expect that any area of
the law will stay static over the long term. Given that some scholars and observers
have already come to look critically upon governmental uses of algorithms, perhaps shifting public attitudes will lead to new, potentially more demanding administrative law principles specifically targeting the automated features of the future administrative state.34
While we should have little doubt that norms and best practices will indeed
solidify around how government officials ought to use automated systems–much
112
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as they have developed over the years for the use of other analytic tools, such as
benefit-cost analysis–it is far from clear that the fundamentals of administrative
law will change dramatically in an era of algorithmic governance.35 Judges, after
all, will confront many of the same difficulties scrutinizing machine learning algorithms as they have confronted in the past with respect to other statistical and
technical aspects of administration, which may lead to continued judicial deference as exemplified in Baltimore Gas & Electric.36 In addition, rather than public attitudes turning against governmental use of algorithmic tools, it may just as easily be expected that public expectations will be shaped by widespread acceptance
of artificial intelligence in other facets of life, perhaps even leading to affirmative
demands that governments use algorithmic tools rather than continuing to rely
on slower or less reliable processes. Cautious about ossifying algorithmic governance, judges and administrative law scholars might well resist the urge to impose
new doctrinal hurdles on automation.37 They may also conclude, as would be reasonable, that existing doctrine contains what is needed to ensure that government
agencies use automated systems responsibly.
As a result, if government agencies wish to expand the responsible use of
properly trained, audited, and validated automated systems that are sufficiently
aligned with legislative mandates and improve agencies’ ability to perform key
tasks, it seems they will hardly need any transformation of traditional administrative law principles to accommodate these innovations. Nor will administrative
law need to adapt much, if at all, to ensure that kind of responsible use of algorithmic governance. Overall, an automated state could conceivably do a better job
than ever before of fulfilling the vision of good governance that has long animated
administrative law.

S

till, even if the prevailing principles of administrative law can deal adequately with public sector use of machine learning algorithms, something
important could easily end up getting lost in an automated state. Such an
administrative government might be smarter, more democratically accountable,
and even more fair. But it could also lack feeling, even more than sterile bureaucratic processes do today. Interactions with government through smartphones
and automated chats may be fine for making campground reservations at national parks or even for filing taxes. But they run the risk of leaving out an important ingredient of good governance–namely, empathy–in those circumstances in which government must make highly consequential decisions affecting the
well-being of individuals. In such circumstances, empathy demands that administrative agencies provide opportunities for human interaction and for listening
and expressions of concern. An important challenge for administrative law in the
decades to come will be to find ways to encourage an automated state that is also
an empathic state.
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A desire for empathy, of course, need not impede the development of automation.38 If government manages the transition to an automated state well, it is possible that automation can enhance the government’s ability to provide empathy to
members of the public, but only if government officials are sufficiently attentive
to the need to do so. This need will become even greater as the overall economy
moves toward greater reliance on artificial intelligence and other automated systems. Society will need to value and find new ways to fulfill those tasks involving
empathy that humans are good at fulfilling. The goal should be, as technologist
Kai-Fu Lee has noted, to ensure that, “while AI handles the routine optimization
tasks, human beings . . . bring the personal, creative, and compassionate touch.”39
Already, public administration experts recognize that this is one of the great
potential advantages of moving to an automated state. It can free up government
workers from drudgery and backlogs of files to process, while leaving them more
time and opportunities to connect with those affected by agency decisions.40 A recent report jointly issued by the Partnership for Public Service and the IBM Center
for Business and Government explains the importance of this shift in what government employees do:
Many observers who envision greater use of AI in government picture more face-toface interactions between agency employees and customers, and additional opportunities for more personalized customer services. The shift toward employees engaging
more with agency customers is expected to be one of several possible effects of automating administrative tasks. Relieved of burdensome paperwork, immigration officers could spend more time interacting with visa applicants or following up on individual immigration cases. Scientists could allot more of their day to working with research study participants. And grants managers could take more time to learn about
and support individual grantees. On average, federal employees now spend only 2 percent of their time communicating with customers and other people outside their agencies, or less than one hour in a workweek, according to one study. At the same time,
citizens want government to do better. The experiences customers have with companies is driving demand for personalized government services. In a survey of more than
6,000 people from six countries, including the United States, 44 percent of respondents identified personalized government services as a priority.41

Not only does a substantial portion of the public already recognize the need for
empathic, personalized engagement opportunities with government, but as private sector organizations invest more in personalized services, this will only
heighten and broaden expectations for similar empathy from government. We already know from extensive research on procedural justice that the way that government treats members of the public affects their sense of legitimacy in the outcomes they receive.42 To build public trust in an automated state, government
authorities will need to ensure that members of the public still feel a human con114
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nection. As political philosopher Amanda Greene has put it, “government must
be seen to be sincerely caring about each person’s welfare.”43
Can administrative law help encourage empathic administrative processes?
Some might say that this is already a purpose underlying the procedural due process principles that make up administrative law. Goldberg v. Kelly, after all, guarantees certain recipients of government benefits the right to an oral hearing before a
neutral decision-maker prior to the termination of their benefits, a right that does
afford at least an opportunity for affected individuals to engage with a theoretically empathic administrative judge.44 But the now-canonical test of procedural due
process reflected in Mathews v. Eldridge is almost entirely devoid of attention to the
role of listening, caring, and concern in government’s interactions with members
of the public.45 Mathews defines procedural due process in terms of a balance of
three factors: 1) the affected private interests; 2) the potential for reducing decision-making error; and 3) the government’s interests concerning fiscal and administrative burdens. Machine learning automation would seem to pass muster
quite easily under the Mathews balancing test. The first factor–the private interests at stake–will be external to machine learning, but machine learning systems
would seem always to fare well under the second and third factors. Their great
promise is that they can reduce errors and lower administrative costs.
This is where existing principles of administrative law will fall short in an automated state and where the need for greater vision will be needed. Hearing rights and
the need for reasons are about more than just achieving accurate outcomes, which
is what the Mathews framework implies. On the contrary, hearings and reasongiving might not be all that good at achieving accurate outcomes, at least not as consistently as automated systems. A 2011 study showed that, among the fifteen most
active administrative judges in one office of the Social Security Administration,
“the judge grant rates . . . ranged . . . from less than 10 percent being granted to over
90 percent.”46 The study revealed, for example, that three judges in this same office
awarded benefits to no more than 30 percent of their applicants, while three other
judges awarded to more than 70 percent.47 Other studies have suggested that racial
disparities may exist in Social Security disability awards, with certain Black applicants tending to receive less favorable outcomes than White applicants.48 Against
this kind of track record, automated systems promise distinct advantages when
they can be shown to deliver fairer, more consistent, and even speedier decisions.
But humans will still be good at listening and empathizing with the predicaments of those who are seeking assistance or other decisions from government, or
who otherwise find themselves subjected to its constraints.49 It is that human quality of empathy that should lead the administrative law of procedural due process to
move beyond just its current emphasis on reducing errors and lowering costs.
To some judges, the need for an administrative law of empathy may lead them
to ask whether members of the public have a “right to a human decision” within
150 (3) Summer 2021
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an automated state.50 But not all human decisions are necessarily empathic ones.
Moreover, a right to a human decision would bring with it the possibility that the
law would accept all the flaws in human decision-making simply to retain one of
the virtues of human engagement. If automated decisions turn out increasingly
to be more accurate and less biased than human ones, a right to a decision by humans would seem to deny the public the desirable improvements in governmental
performance that algorithms can deliver.
Administrative law need not stand in the way of these improvements. It can
accept the use of machine learning algorithms while nevertheless pushing government forward toward additional opportunities for listening and compassionate responses.51 Much as the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly insisted on a pretermination hearing for welfare recipients, courts in the future can ask whether
certain interests are of a sufficient quality and importance to demand that agencies provide supplemental engagement and assistance with individuals subjected
to automated processes. Courts could in this way seek to reinforce best practices
in agency efforts to provide empathic outreach and assistance.
In the end, if administrative law in an automated state is to adopt any new
rights, society might be better served if courts avoid the recognition of a right to
a human decision. Instead, courts could consider and seek to define a right to human empathy.
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